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Evidence.  State v. Doyle, 235 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2020).  An ousted 
manager may not assert attorney-client privilege on behalf of the 
corporation when the attorney’s testimony is limited to the 
corporation’s representation.  A trial justice does not abuse her 
discretion by allowing a police investigator to offer opinion evidence 
that is rationally based on her own personal observations and 
training.  A trial court justice does not abuse her discretion by 
permitting evidence of prior uncharged bad acts when the evidence 
has independent evidentiary value.  Finally, a defendant waives 
any argument on appeal that is not properly raised before the trial 
court.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The Defendant, Daniel Doyle (Doyle), was the former Executive 
Director of the Institute for International Sport (the Institute).1  
The Institute was founded in 1987 to “expand[ ] the opportunities 
for young people around the world to participate in sports activities 
in order to improve and develop their capabilities.”2  Originally, the 
Institute was located in Adams Hall at the University of Rhode 
Island (URI) but, after several years, its offices were relocated to 
the “Hall of Fame Building” in Kingston, Rhode Island.3  In the 
early 2000s, Doyle decided that the Institute had outgrown the Hall 
of Fame Building and that a second building for the Institute, the 
“Leadership Building,” was necessary.4   
To fund the construction of the Leadership Building, Doyle 
obtained donations from, among others, Alan Hassenfeld 
(Hassenfeld).5  In January 2007, Doyle sent a letter to Hassenfeld 
thanking him for his $550,000 that would go towards “the 
1. State v. Doyle, 235 A.3d 482, 489 (R.I. 2020).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 490.
4. Id.
5. Id.  Alan Hassenfeld is the former chairman and CEO of Hasbro, Inc.
Id. 
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construction of the Center for Sports Leadership Building on the 
URI campus.”6  In 2007, Doyle also secured two grants from the 
Rhode Island General Assembly’s Joint Committee on Legislative 
Services (JCLS) in the amount of $575,000.7  Trial evidence 
established that the two JCLS grants were enough to cover the cost 
of the Leadership Building project.8  In 2009, and again in 2011, 
the director of JCLS noticed that the project was still not complete, 
prompting an investigation by the state Auditor General.9   
After the Auditor General completed his investigation and 
issued his report, a grand jury investigation into Doyle and the 
Institute followed.10  Doyle waived the Institute’s attorney-client 
privilege so attorney William Lynch (Lynch) could provide relevant 
documents to the Rhode Island State Police.11  While attorney 
Lynch had represented Doyle in a personal capacity at one point, 
Lynch’s testimony to the grand jury was limited to his 
representation of the Institute.12  The grand jury investigation 
resulted in an eighteen-count indictment.13   
Before the twelve-week trial, Doyle filed a pretrial motion in 
limine to exclude wholesale evidence regarding the “JCLS grant for 
the construction of the Leadership Building, the Institute’s 
financial transactions (and indebtedness) to [URI], and events 
occurring in the ‘1990s and 2000s[ ]’” because it constituted 
“‘uncharged bad character evidence’ under Rule 404(b)” Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence.14  In a preliminary ruling, the trial justice 
denied the motion because the state’s planned evidence appeared to 
have independent relevance and it would be “impossible and 
6. Id. at 515.




11. Id. at 501.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 490.  The eighteen-count indictment included:
[S]even counts of embezzlement in violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 11-41-
3, one count of obtaining money under false pretenses under §§11-41-
4 and 11-41-5, five counts of forgery in violation of G.L 1956 § 11-17-
1, and five counts of giving false documents to an agent, employee, or
public official in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-18-1.
Id.  
14. Id. at 492, 496.
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inequitable” to rule on the motion without hearing a word of 
testimony or to completely exclude a witness from appearing at 
trial.15  Doyle made a “continuing objection” to the admission of the 
state’s witnesses’ testimony on the issue.16  He also moved to 
dismiss the indictment, arguing that attorney Lynch had testified 
to matters beyond the scope of the attorney-client privilege 
waiver.17  The trial justice determined that no attorney-client 
privilege existed between Doyle and Lynch personally and denied 
the motion.18 
Before trial, a Superior Court justice also ousted Doyle as 
director and placed the Institute into a temporary receivership.19  
Attorney Jonathan Savage (Savage) was appointed and 
subsequently waived the Institute’s attorney-client privilege for 
attorney John Partridge (Partridge), who assisted the Institute 
when it was incorporated in the 1980s.20  Doyle attempted to 
withdraw the previous waiver of attorney-client privilege for 
attorney Lynch, but the trial judge allowed both attorneys to testify 
based on her earlier ruling that no privilege existed between Doyle 
15. Id. at 492–93.
16. Id. at 494.  Rule 51 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure
governs the use of “continuing objections.”  R.I Super. R. Crim. P. 51 (2016)
(amended 2017).  At the time of trial, Rule 51 provided: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; 
but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been neces-
sary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the 
court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which 
the party desires the court to take or his or her objection to the action 
of the court and his or her grounds therefor if requested; and if a party 
has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, 
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice the party.  With 
the consent of the court a party may object to an entire line of testimony, 
or to the entire testimony of a witness, or to testimony on a single sub-
ject matter, and if such objection shall be overruled, it shall not be nec-
essary for the party to repeat his or her objection thereafter, but every 
part of such testimony thereafter introduced shall be deemed to have 
been duly objected to and the objection overruled. 
Id. (the emphasized portion was eliminated in 2017). 
17. Doyle, 235 A.3d at 501.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 502.
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and Lynch and that the receiver had authorized Partridge to 
testify.21   
Finally, at a pre-trial hearing, Doyle moved to have the court 
suppress evidence that, he argued, was illegally obtained by the 
state.22  Two former employees provided investigators with 
materials that they had collected during their time at the Institute, 
apparently to protect themselves as whistleblowers in the event 
that the Institute came under investigation.23  The investigators 
were not aware that the former employees had such materials 
before speaking with them and they overturned the evidence 
voluntarily.24  The Institute’s secretary at the time also provided a 
thumb-drive with Institute-related documents in response to a 
grand jury subpoena duces tecum.25  The trial justice denied the 
motion because the former employees were private individuals and 
the investigators did not “contort[ ] or misuse[ ] or abuse[ ]” the 
subpoena authority.26 
During the twelve-week trial, the jury heard evidence that 
established, inter alia, that Doyle had taken an unauthorized 
second salary from the Institute totaling $501,538.52, embezzled 
$251,157.92 from the Institute in the form of unauthorized loan 
repayments and bonuses, used $117,274.41 of the Institute’s funds 
for personal projects and business ventures, put $145,332.36 on the 
Institute’s American Express Credit Card, made unauthorized 
tuition payments to his daughters’ colleges amounting in 
$98,947.97, made unauthorized donations to his alma mater in the 
amount of $22,300, and “diverted almost $550,000 of the money 
that Mr. Hassenfeld pledged for the Leadership Building for 
[Doyle’s] personal benefit.”27   
On appeal, Doyle challenged the admissibility of various 
evidence.  Based on her extensive review of Doyle’s credit card 
21. Id.
22. Id. at 507.
23. Id. at 508, 510 n.14.
24. Id. at 508.
25. Id.  A subpoena duces tecum is “[a] subpoena ordering the witness to
appear in court and to bring specified documents, records, or things.”  Sub-
poena Duces Tecum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 10th 
ed. 2009). 
26. Doyle, 235 A.3d at 508.
27. Id. at 491.
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charges and interviews with vendors, Detective Courtney Elliot of 
the Rhode Island State Police testified that Doyle had incurred at 
least $145,332.36 in unauthorized personal expenses on the 
Institute’s American Express credit card.28  At trial Doyle objected 
to the evidence, alternating between arguing that Detective Elliot 
was giving opinion evidence as a lay witness in violation of Rule 701 
and that she was giving expert testimony without being properly 
qualified as an expert witness in violation of Rule 702.29 
Furthermore, Robert Zagrodny (Zagrodny), the Institute’s 
accountant from 2008 to 2011, testified on cross-examination that 
he resigned from the Institute because of multiple “red-flags.”30  On 
redirect, when the state inquired into the referenced red-flags, 
Zagrodny testified that he suspected that Doyle had forged a 
signature on a donation pledge because he did not know that the 
grand jury investigation had determined that the signature was 
indeed valid.31  Doyle’s counsel did not object to the testimony at 
the time.32   
Finally, after the state concluded its direct examination of a 
key witness, defense counsel declined to cross-examine, to which 
the prosecutor responded, “[w]ow.”33  A week later, defense counsel 
brought the comment to the trial justice’s attention and said the 
comment “is one that merits serious concern and consideration as 
to whether or not it’s grounds for a mistrial.”34  Doyle’s counsel 
asked for a limiting instruction to be given in the final jury charge, 
but he did not object when the trial justice failed to give such an 
instruction.35  The prosecution did not comment on the issue.36 
28. Id. at 499.
29. Id.  Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, Rule 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in 
the form of opinions is limited to those opinions which are (A) ration-
ally based on the perception of the witness and (B) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact 
in issue. 
R.I. R. EVID. 701.
30. Doyle, 235 A.3d at 504–05.
31. Id. at 505.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 510–11.
34. Id. at 511 (emphasis in original).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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After the jury returned a guilty verdict on all eighteen charges, 
Doyle moved for a new trial.37  He presented “over a dozen 
arguments” in support of his motion, none of which raised the issue 
of elements of the crime of embezzlement.38  He also made a motion 
in arrest of judgement.39  The trial judge denied both motions, 
concluding that the offenses had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that no “infirmities in the indictment,” deficiencies in 
jurisdiction, nor violations of the attorney-client privilege 
occurred.40  After Doyle was sentenced—to “seven concurrent terms 
of fifteen years, with seven years to serve, and six terms of ten 
years, with five years to serve, with the remainder of those terms 
suspended with probation; five terms of one year, suspended with 
probation; and restitution”—this appeal followed.41   
On appeal, Doyle raised eight issues: 
(1) the trial justice improperly allowed the use of
prejudicial evidence in violation of Rule 404(b); (2) the trial
justice improperly permitted a Rhode Island State Police
detective to provide expert opinion testimony as a lay
witness; (3) the trial justice erroneously allowed an
improper waiver of the attorney-client privilege; (4) the
State of Rhode Island knowingly or recklessly presented
false evidence at trial; (5) the trial justice erred when she
denied [Doyle’s] motion to suppress evidence he claimed
was illegally obtained by state action; (6) the trial justice
erred when she failed to grant a mistrial after a prosecutor
made an improper remark in the courtroom; (7) the
embezzlement convictions contravene the weight of the
evidence; and (8) the evidence is insufficient to support the
charges of embezzlement and larceny by false pretenses.42
However, because Doyle’s arguments were either not preserved 
for appeal or did not have merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment of conviction on all counts.43   
37. Id. at 513.
38. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Despite most of the arguments not being properly preserved for 
appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed each of Doyle’s 
contentions.44  As for the first issue, whether the trial judge erred 
by allowing the state to present evidence that Doyle claimed was 
related solely to his bad character in violation of Rule 404(b),45 
Doyle argued that Rule 404(b) evidence “should be used sparingly 
and only when reasonably necessary.”46  However, the Court held 
that Doyle did not properly preserve his Rule 404(b) argument 
when he set forth a “continuing objection” to wholesale evidence 
relating to the “JCLS grant for the construction of the Leadership 
Building, the Institute’s financial transactions (and indebtedness) 
to [URI], and events occurring in the 1990s and 2000s.”47  But, even 
if the issue had been properly preserved, the Court held that the 
trial judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting the challenged 
evidence.48   
However, because the continuing objection was so expansive 
and lacked specific grounds to support exclusion, the trial justice 
was not empowered to determine whether each piece of the “bad 
acts” evidence had appropriate independent relevance under Rule 
404(b).49  Additionally, the trial justice could not balance relevance 
against potential unfair prejudice as required by Rule 403. 
Therefore, the court did not have an adequate record for review.50  
However, even if there was an adequate record for review, the 
evidence was still properly admitted.51  The “independent 
44. Id.
45. Id.  Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that 
defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was reason-
able. 
R.I. R. EVID. 404(b).
46. Doyle, 235 A.3d at 496.
47. Id. 492.
48. Id. at 495.
49. Id. at 493–94.
50. Id. at 494.
51. Id. 493–94.
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relevance” standard applies to non-sexual crimes,52 and the 
challenged evidence established Doyle’s “intent and motive to 
prolong his ‘far-flung chicanery’ and coverup, as well as his 
consciousness of guilt.”53  
As for the second issue, Doyle argued that Detective Courtney 
Elliot provided expert opinion testimony as a lay witness.54  The 
Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion when 
she permitted the detective to offer her opinion as to whether 
Doyle’s credit card charges were legitimate business or illegitimate 
personal expenses.55  Because Detective Courtney’s opinion was 
rationally based on her own “extensive review of thousands of 
defendant’s transactions and her follow-up interviews, calls, and 
e-mail exchanges with parties involved in the transactions,” and
her opinions were “helpful to a clear understanding of the facts at
issue,” it was permitted under Rule 701.56  Furthermore, the Court
rejected Doyle’s contention that the testimony was “expert
testimony” because opinion testimony regarding the type of
expenses on a credit card “is not the type of scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge contemplated by Rule 702.”57
Third, Doyle argued that the trial judge committed reversible 
error when she allowed the Institute’s court appointed receiver to 
waive the Institute’s attorney-client privilege so that the Institute’s 
former legal representative and the attorney that assisted in 
incorporating the Institute could testify against Doyle.58  This was 
the first time that the Rhode Island Supreme Court was called on 
to rule on the attorney-client privilege as it relates to corporate 
52. Id. at 496.  The “reasonably necessary” standard that Doyle argued
applied to the Rule 404(b) evidence only applies when a defendant is charged 
with a sexual offense.  Id. at 493 (citing State v. Rainey, 175 A.3d 1169, 1182 
(R.I. 2018)).  Uncharged sexual misconduct can only be admitted if it is rele-
vant to proving the charged misconduct and “reasonably necessary.”  Id at 496 
(emphasis added).   
53. Id. at 497.
54. Id. at 498.
55. Id. at 501.
56. Id. at 500.
57. Id.  Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 provides: “If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of fact or opinion.”  R.I. R. EVID. 702. 
58. Doyle, 235 A.3d at 501.
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clients,59 but the Court reiterated the well-settled rule from Upjohn 
Co. v. United States:60 the attorney-client privilege attaches to 
individuals as well as corporations.61  The Court also relied on 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, where the 
United States Supreme Court held that “displaced managers may 
not assert the privilege over the wishes of the current mangers, 
even as to statements that the former might have made to counsel 
concerning matters within the scope of the corporate duties.”62  
Here, the Court held that the trial justice did not commit reversible 
error because Doyle had been “divested of any authority to manage 
or to conduct the affairs of the corporation.”63  Furthermore, the 
testimony that the witnesses were expected to testify to concerned 
only the Institute as a corporate client and not Doyle personally.64  
Fourth, Doyle argued that a new trial was warranted because 
the state knowingly or recklessly presented false evidence when 
Zagrodny testified that he thought (incorrectly) Doyle forged a 
signature on a donation pledge.65  The Court held that Doyle did 
not properly preserve his argument that a mistrial was warranted 
because he merely stated that the Court “should be concerned” 
about whether the issue warranted a mistrial but did not timely 
object to the admission of the testimony in question.66  A motion for 
a mistrial in a criminal case is “serious business” that requires the 
reasons for the mistrial to be clearly articulated and the state to be 
given an opportunity to respond.67  Hence, the Court reasoned that 
Doyle’s vague statement was not a motion to pass the case that 
enabled the trial justice to fully evaluate the basis for the motion, 
determine whether the potential unfair prejudice could be cured 
with a cautionary jury instruction, or to empower the state to 
respond.68 
59. Id. at 503.
60. Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)).
61. Id. at 503.
62. Id. (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471
U.S. 343 (1985)). 
63. Id. at 504.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 504–05.
66. Id. at 506–07.
67. Id. at 507.
68. Id.
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The fifth issue on appeal was whether the trial justice erred by 
denying Doyle’s motion to suppress evidence that he alleged was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.69  The Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when two private 
individuals voluntarily provided evidence to investigators who were 
unaware that the witnesses had such evidence and evidence that 
one witness provided in response to a grand jury subpoena duces 
tecum.70  The Fourth Amendment is meant to deter police and 
prosecutorial misconduct,71 not private conduct, and so the Court 
reasoned that, because the voluntary and unprovoked searches 
were private searches that investigators did not significantly 
expand, the evidence was not obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.72  Moreover, because the subpoenaed documents were 
not Doyle’s personal papers, but documents produced by the 
witness in the course of her work as secretary for the Institute, 
Doyle did not have a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
materials subpoenaed,” and so the Fourth Amendment was not 
implicated.73   
The sixth issue on appeal was whether a new trial was 
warranted when the prosecutor said “[w]ow” after the defense 
counsel declined to cross-examine a witness.74  The Court held that 
Doyle did not preserve his argument because he did not 
contemporaneously object to the statement, raised the issue to the 
judge in a “vague and uncertain” manner, and failed to object when 
the trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction at the close of 
trial.75  Despite having ample opportunity to object, Doyle failed to 
bring the comment to the trial justice’s attention, and so, she could 
not poll the jurors to determine the prejudicial effect of the 
statement or allow the state to attempt to explain the statement.76  
69. Id. at 507.
70. Id. at 509–10.
71. Id. at 509 (citing State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 861 (R.I. 1991)).
72. Id. at 510.  The Court also noted that Doyle had failed to establish that
the materials given to investigators even belonged to the him.  Id. 
73. Id. at 510; see State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 733 (R.I. 1997) (holding
that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when the defend-
ant does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the seized evidence).    
74. Doyle, 235 A.3d at 510.
75. Id. at 512.
76. Id.
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Therefore, there was not an adequate record for the court to 
determine whether the statement warranted a mistrial.77 
The seventh issue on appeal, whether a new trial was 
warranted based on the weight of the evidence, was also plagued 
with preservation issues.78  On appeal, Doyle advanced a novel 
theory: an element of secrecy is required for the crime of 
embezzlement.79  The Court denied the motion for a new trial based 
on the weight of the evidence because Doyle waived his argument 
for appeal.80   
The Court also denied Doyle’s motion for a new trial based on 
the sufficiency of the evidence, the eighth and final issue on 
appeal.81  The Court held that the trial justice did not err when she 
found the evidence sufficient to support the conviction for obtaining 
money under false pretenses.82  Assuming that the issue was 
properly preserved for appeal, the Court noted that the evidence 
established that Doyle told Hassenfeld that his gift would be used 
to construct a new building and that a “substantial amount of these 
funds [were] diverted for the defendant’s own personal benefit.”83  
Because of this, the Court reasoned that the evidence was “more 
than sufficient” for the jury to reasonably conclude that the 
essential elements of obtaining property by false pretenses were 
met.84   
For the foregoing reasons, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment of conviction and remanded the record to the 
Superior Court.85 
77. Id.
78. Id. at 512–13.
79. Id. at 513.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 516.
82. Id. at 515.
83. Id. at 516.
84. Id.; see also 11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-4 (2020) (“Every person who
shall obtain from another designedly, by any false pretense or pretenses, any 
money, goods, wares, or other property, with intent to cheat or defraud . . . 
shall be deemed guilty of larceny.”); State v. Letts, 986 A.2d 1006, 1011 (R.I. 
2010) (“The essential elements of obtaining property by false pretense are that 
the accused (1) obtain property from another designedly, by any false pretense; 
and (2) with the intent to cheat or defraud.”).  Id. at 515. 
85. Id. at 516.
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COMMENTARY 
This case stands as a cautionary tale that highlights the 
importance of preserving arguments for appeal.  Out of the eight 
issues on appeal, only three passed without the Court mentioning 
the “raise-or-waive” rule.86  Two issues in particular should have 
been preserved: the prosecutor’s “[w]ow” comment and the state’s 
presentation of false evidence.  The “[w]ow” comment could have 
had a severe prejudicial effect on the jury, since it could be 
interpreted as the state vouching for the witness, or worse, 
violating Doyle’s right to decline cross-examination of a witness. 
Furthermore, witness testimony that Doyle had forged a signature 
when he had been cleared of that misconduct could have also been 
extremely prejudicial.   
Additionally, the issue concerning illegally obtained evidence 
may merit closer inspection, even if not on the specific facts of this 
case.  By permitting evidence given to police unprovoked and 
voluntarily, the court may encourage police officers to lie when they 
violate suspects’ constitutional rights by refashioning an illegal 
search by police as a private search.  The Court did not appear to 
consider how police may use legal “private searches” against the 
falsely accused or the illegally arrested individual.   
Be that as it may, the Court made clear that the weight of the 
evidence against the defendant and the meritless arguments 
properly before the Court ensured that any evidentiary error that 
the trial justice may have made was harmless.  For example, the 
evidence presented established that Doyle had solicited funds from 
the Hassenfeld Foundation under false pretenses and that he 
diverted hundreds of thousands of dollars from Institute accounts 
for his personal benefit.  Viewing this evidence in light most 
favorable to the state, it is difficult to see how any reasonable jury 
could not find that Doyle “intended to cheat and defraud” his 
victims.   
86. See id. at 493, 499, 506, 511, 513; see also Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d
1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019) (“It is well settled that a litigant cannot raise an objec-
tion or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial 
court.”).  
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the Defendant’s contentions otherwise, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not commit 
reversible error by admitting any of the challenged evidence and 
that the conviction was substantially supported by the evidence.  
The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. 
 Rebekkah Ruth Nardi Stoeckler 
